Learning the ethnicity and politically history of Nigeria

Ethnicity is generally regarded as the most basicand politically salient identity in Nigeria. This claim is supported by the fact that both in competitive and non-competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity. Indeed, according to the authoritative 2000 survey on “Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria”, ethnicity “is demonstrably
the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria” (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 27).  Thus, the survey foundthat
almost one-half (48.2%)of Nigerianschose to label themselves with an ethnic (including linguistic and local-regional) identity,compared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and 21.0 percent who chose a religious identity (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 24-25). In essence, close totwo-thirds of the population see themselves as members ofprimordial ethnic, regional, and religious groups. In other words, “Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin  than the class solidarities ofthe workplace” (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 25). What is more, “religious and ethnic identities are more fully formed, more holistic and more strongly felt than class identities” asevidenced in the fact that “whereas those who identify with religious and ethnic communities are almost universally proud of their group identities…those who see themselves as members of a social class are somewhat more equivocal about their pride” (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 26).All ofthis is not surprising, considering that ethnic formations are perhaps the most historically enduring behavioural units in the country, and were further reinforced by the colonial and post-colonial regimes Yet, in spiteof thesalience ofethnicity, and thelarge number of studies that have been
devoted to the subject, the exact number of ethnic groups in the country is not known. Different estimations have been given, notably, including:248 (Coleman 1958),394 (Hoffman 1974), 62 (Murdock 1975), 161 (Gandonu 1978), 143 (Odetola 1978), 619 (Wente-Lukas 1985), and 374 (Otite1990). Arecent ethnic mapping project puts the number at over 500 (PEFS 2001). The widevariation is largely explained by the different criteria used by the authors. Although language, kinship, coreterritoriality and myth of common originare the main criteria, with in-group/out-group self definitions as correcting factor, thereis noagreement on how to treat dialects of languages for example. Do these dialects constitute separate groups, or should they be regarded as sub-groupings or communal groups? Matters are not helped by thefact that ethnic
identities and differentiations are intricately linked with other identities like religion, and furthermore they do not exist in pure form. There is also the fact that ethnic identities and boundaries, including myths of common
origin, are fluid and subject to continuous construction and reconstruction. The case of the Ikwerre in the Rivers state is a good example of the problematic definition. They were Igbo before the civil war, but have since re-defined themselves to be a separate group. Migrant and dispersed groups that have somewhat become distant from the original group constitute another category of problematic classification:should theybe
regarded as part of the original group or as a different group? In the final analysis, it is clear that ethnic diversity cannot be defined only in terms of categories employed by linguists and ethnographers. There is also the whole dimension of self-definition by members of the group and outsiders, which is a much  more important determinant of so-called ethnic-based behaviour. As much as possible therefore, the objective diacritic, which many scholars emphasize, should be consistent with the ‘constructed reality’, self-ascribed identities, or‘imagined  communities’ of members of the group and outsiders to be valid. This is one useful way of assessing the validity of the various estimations.